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Karel Davids’ concise book (278 pages, with index and bibliography) is 
unlikely to end the debate on why and how Europe gained a technological 
edge over China, but it performs important work in evaluating earlier 
positions and pointing out new directions for research. Davids, professor of 
global history at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, has published widely 
on the knowledge infrastructures—guilds, navigation schools, universities, 
etc.—of the Dutch Republic and on Jesuit scientific networks in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century. His concern in this book is only partly 
with the “Great Divergence” between China and Europe; parts of the book 
are concerned with dating, locating, and explaining the “Little Divergence” 
between Protestant northwestern Europe and the Catholic South. In the 
following comments, I will focus on the parts of the argument that are most 
relevant to historians of East Asia. 
This is a synthetic book: it contains little original research but deftly 
weaves together results from a large number of separate fields. Davids’ 
central argument, carefully stated and qualified in many ways, is that 
religious traditions mattered in both the Great and the Little Divergence. 
This is not a reformulation of Max Weber’s thesis that the inner-worldly 
asceticism of Calvinist Protestantism gave rise to a modern capitalist 
mentality, or of Lynn White’s argument that Christianity, by placing 
mankind above the rest of creation, opened a pathway for the exploitation 
of nature and for rapid technological advance. Davids rejects the 
assumption that religious beliefs determined technological behavior; as he 
rightly points out, the absence of man-nature dualism in East Asia did not 
prevent Chinese and Japanese from despoiling their environments, and the 
search for a link between cosmological beliefs and technological change has 
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yielded few convincing results (pp. 44, 55). To the extent that religion 
shaped the development of technology, it did so indirectly, through social 
practices and institutions. Davids looks at three institutional settings: the 
formation of human capital in apprenticeships, schools, and academies; the 
circulation of technical knowledge in the form of texts and objects or 
through the movement of skilled persons; and the role of religious and 
secular institutions in fostering technological change. 
The first question to ask, of course, is when the divergences of Davids’ 
title first appeared. Davids’ time frame is 700 to 1800, but he does not make 
a strong case for divergent paths between China and Europe (or Southern 
and Northern Europe) in the centuries he covers. In the introduction, he 
states that “in terms of the sheer variety of machines used, China and 
Europe before 1800 looked remarkably similar” (p. 7), while “the general 
level and rate of technological change in China and Europe before the end 
of the eighteenth century did not vary largely” (p. 8). He does see 
“differences in the nature of technological change” (p. 8): a more wide-
spread adoption and steady evolution of new technologies in Europe; a 
greater realization of the potential of technologies, especially in the adop-
tion of mechanical devices; a broader scope of change, involving more 
sectors of the economy (p. 13). On the whole, his story is one of a greater 
build-up of potential in Europe than in China: a laying of different 
foundations rather than a dramatic divergence of paths. There is perhaps 
more than a hint of backward projection in this: because we know that “it 
was Europe, not China, where the transition to a modern industrial 
economy began and sustained economic growth took off” (p. 14), the two 
economies must have differed in important ways before that take-off 
happened, even if observed levels of technological competence are not 
dramatically different. 
Most of the introduction and the first chapter set out the framework for 
Davids’ thesis that differences in technological performance are at least 
partly caused by religious factors. Technology is narrowly defined as “the 
abilities of people to control or transform nature for productive ends,” 
excluding, for example, domestic techniques such as cooking and home-
making (p. 27). Theories that locate technological inventiveness in visions 
of nature and man’s place in creation are discussed at great length and 
found wanting: religious teachings at both ends of the Eurasian continent 
were too complex and internally contradictory to allow for generalizations, 
and there is little evidence that religious views in Europe or China 
translated into coherent sets of attitudes regarding technological change in 
any systematic way. 
Chapter Two takes on one of the indirect ways in which religion may 
have shaped the path of technological development: through the formation 
of human capital, defined (following Fritz Machlup) as the investment in 
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individual persons in ways that enable them to produce more or better 
goods or services, earn higher pecuniary incomes, spend their incomes 
more intelligently, and develop an enhanced appreciation for the “finer 
things” in life. It is not clear why Davids adopts a terminology that 
presupposes a fully monetarized, capitalist economy in which people’s 
actions are motivated by the desire to earn and spend higher cash 
incomes—clearly an unwarranted assumption for much of the medieval 
and early modern world. There is however little doubt that formal and 
informal education is a crucial factor if one wants to understand the 
trajectories of technological change. Davids first discusses formal learning, 
in particular literacy and numeracy. Given the scarcity of data, he often has 
to deal with proxies: the ability to sign one’s names and the quantity of 
books in circulation stand in for literacy; the ability to accurately report 
one’s age for numeracy; literacy and numeracy then stand in for 
technological competence and human capital formation. These are 
methodologically awkward operations, and Davids fully acknowledges the 
resulting uncertainties. As in the earlier discussion of levels of technologi-
cal competence, the evidence on educational attainments is too limited to 
make a hard case for a divergence between Europe and China before 1800. 
Davids then moves on to a discussion of schools, in particular the role of 
European religious institutions in offering primary and secondary 
education to ever larger numbers of students. His discussion of Chinese 
schooling is short and based on a somewhat selective reading of the 
secondary literature. He sees a decline of Buddhist education after the Tang 
and a growing tendency from the Song “towards a system composed of a 
multi-layered state school complex and a network of private schools” (p. 
82). This reading allows him to contrast a diverse European landscape in 
which monastic houses, mendicant orders, and territorial states vied to 
provide education, with a Chinese case in which religious institutions were 
pushed aside, leaving the educational field to the state. What is missing 
here is an appreciation of the factors that really drove popular education in 
Ming and Qing China: the supply of teachers from the ranks of 
examination candidates and the desire of local communities (families, 
lineages, and villages) to prepare their sons for careers in civil service or 
business.  
Davids is on firmer ground when he deals with vocational education. 
China had few institutions comparable to the mining, navigation, and 
fortification schools and professional academies that sprung up across 
Europe since the Renaissance. Technical training in China “overwhelm-
ingly took place via informal learning in the framework of families.” This is 
true as far as it goes, but to understand vocational training in premodern 
China, we have to extend our notion of the family to include large 
communities of agnatic relatives, linked by ties of co-residence, kinship, 
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and shared profession. The Caos 曹 of Jingxian County 涇縣, Anhui, who 
dominated the production of xuan paper 宣紙 from the thirteenth to the 
twentieth century, may have been a “family” and may have trained their 
sons informally, but they are perhaps best seen as a large, complex 
community with a set of formal and informal institutions that sustained 
product innovation for more than five hundred years. Specialized kinship 
groups and village communities of this type can be found in all parts of 
China; together with apprenticeships (only briefly discussed by Davids), 
they played a central role in the reproduction of technical knowledge.  
Chapter Three looks at religion and the circulation of technical know-
ledge, examining in quick succession print industries, illustrations, models 
and templates, manuscripts, and collections (libraries, museums, botanical 
gardens, etc.). Here, Davids makes a clear and convincing case for a more 
efficient circulation of technical knowledge in printed, hand-written, and 
artifactual form in Europe. In particular, Europeans developed more 
effective forms of graphic representations and used them to “think on 
paper” (p. 142) in ways the Chinese did not. European encyclopedias of 
useful knowledge circulated more widely; libraries and artifact collections 
were more numerous and open to a wider public; religious and secular 
institutions were more active in collecting and reproducing useful know-
ledge. Differences between China and Europe are less clear-cut in the 
circulation of knowledge via the movement of people, which, as Davids 
rightly points out, must have accounted for most of the spread of technical 
information (p. 124). In both China and Europe, such movements were 
partly institutionalized: China saw periodic movement of examination 
candidates to provincial and national capitals and, before the mid-Ming, 
the circulation of artisans under the corvée system; Europe saw religious 
travelling in the form of pilgrimages and visitations within networks of 
affiliated monasteries, as well as the tramping of journeymen. China, 
Davids argues, did not see much religiously inspired movement of people 
and ideas, at least not after the Tang. From this he concludes that “in the 
Chinese empire, movements of people relevant to the circulation of tech-
nical knowledge were dependent on state regulation for a longer time and 
to a greater extent than in Europe” (p. 169). There is some truth to this as 
Chinese governments did actively encourage and manage population 
movements in ways European governments did not, but the notion of an 
interfering Chinese state that checked the movement of people across its 
territory is clearly wrong. In contrast to Europe, where every city state and 
principality regulated the immigration and emigration of skilled labor, and 
where rights to employment were often conditional on birth as a citizen 
and membership in the dominant local confession, all Chinese since the 
mid-Ming enjoyed freedom of movement across a continent-sized 
country—and widely availed themselves of that freedom, as the existence 
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of native-place associations all over China demonstrates. Here, Davids 
looks only for the presence or absence of European practices or institutions 
in China, and reads their absence as a lack: in Europe, religiously 
motivated migration wrought positive changes; China had little migration 
of that kind; therefore China falls short in that respect. In this light, even 
forced confessional migrations, such as the expulsion of the Huguenots 
from France, is seen in a positive light, as contributing to the dispersion of 
technical knowledge. What is missing here is a realization that political 
fragmentation and confessional divides were, first of all, obstacles to the 
movement of people and ideas across Europe, even if the same forces could 
sometimes set people and ideas in motion, and that a religiously less 
conflicted Chinese state may have provided a much more conducive 
environment for the circulation of people and ideas.  
The fourth and final chapter deals with the mechanisms of technical 
innovation in Europe and China. Much of the chapter discusses river 
control in northern Italy, the Netherlands, and China, a topic on which 
Davids has published before. Davids shows (convincingly, in my non-
expert view) that engineers in the Papal States managed to integrate the 
experiential knowledge of local experts with the new science of river 
hydraulics, in ways that the Chinese Yellow River bureaucracy did not. His 
argument for a role of religion in the creation of new knowledge here is 
somewhat tenuous, since his “religious” actor here is in essence a territorial 
state, albeit one headed by the pope. On pp. 188-193, he develops a more 
systematic comparison between the drivers of technological creativity in 
China and Europe: the greater ability in Europe to think pictorially through 
the use of accurate drawings and sketches; the existence of a variety of 
institutional support structures—states, religious institutions, markets—for 
technical innovation, the notion (absent or undeveloped in China) of laws 
pertaining to physical nature. Again, much of the argument centers on the 
central role of the Chinese state in fostering technological change and the 
absence of (secular or religious) alternatives to the state. Part of the 
problem here, it seems, is Davids’ conception of the Chinese state as a 
monolithic centralized bureaucracy. Throughout the text, Davids (like 
many other writers in the field) sees the European competition between 
state and church, state and state, and church and church as a driver of 
technological change; to the extent that such competition was absent in 
China, China falls short of an implied model. But the Chinese state was 
neither unified nor monolithic: local authorities, the central government, 
and the imperial household with its workshops in Beijing and in the 
provinces operated independently of each other and drove technological 
change in different ways. The Chinese state was monolithic only in the 
sense that it established relatively uniform conditions throughout the 
empire, making it possible for Hakka migrants from Guangdong and 
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Fujian to spread their mining, cash-cropping, and manufacturing skills 
throughout central and southern China, or for Huizhou and Shanxi 
merchants to develop financing and trading networks that stretched from 
Tianjin to Canton and from Beijing to Chengdu. The actors that need to be 
considered to understand technical change in China include merchant 
networks rooted in shared local origin, communities of ethnic migrants that 
roamed across the Chinese countryside, villages and kinship groups that 
funded schools and reproduced artisanal skills, imperially commissioned 
technocrats of unfree (eunuch or bondservant) status. These are unfamiliar 
groups from an Europeanist’s perspective, especially one used to the 
binary of state and church. The fault for this oversight does not lie with the 
author: with very few exceptions, Davids relies on the most recent China 
scholarship available. It is us China scholars who have failed to 
demonstrate convincingly that the mechanisms and institutions that drove 
technological change in China were different from those in Europe, and 
that these unfamiliar actors need to be studied in their own right. 
 
 
